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This paper is an attempt to clarify one of the rarely mentioned and discussed questions in 
Heidegger’s thought on translation, the “untranslatable”. Drawing on Heidegger’s views on 
language and translation as well as on its pertinent secondary literature, I argue that, for Heidegger, 
the “untranslatable” in a work of thought or poetry is thought of as a manifestation of the claim of 
language. This claim is a calling to the human being to reconsider our relationship to language, to 
think its “essence” (Wesen) no longer as a tool of communication at our disposal but as world 
disclosive. The appearing and disappearing of beings in the world do not occur because of our 
actions. Rather, it is language that grants being to beings so that they are made present or absent 
in the world.  
        In section one, I will show that expressing itself in the irreducible difference between 
languages, and in its being a remainder, rest or space that is constantly calling for translation, as 
well as its being more expressive in “words of thought”, the untranslatable offers itself as a moment 
of the manifestation of the claim of language. In section two, I will argue that one of the moments 
language claims poets is the moment where they undergo an experience with language in their 
failure to find the right word for what language already calls them to name. Section three argues 
that translating a work of thought or poetry, in light of Heidegger’s views on language and 








Despite its seeming subordination compared to other questions (i.e., Being, time, language, 
technology, metaphysics, Art, poetry, thinking, etc.) in Heidegger’s work, the question of 
translation is in fact at the heart of Heidegger’s thought. It is a vital question that penetrates one 
way or another almost every philosophical question that Heidegger addresses. The question of 
translation is so important for Heidegger that he, in a seminar given in 1955 in Cérisy-la-Salle 
(France), identified it with the tradition of philosophy as he states: “insofar as language or the 
concept of language (Sprachbegriff) thinks ahead of any thinking, the tradition of philosophy 
necessarily becomes translation” (Heidegger1, cited in Emad, 2010, p. 295). Eliane Escoubas 
elaborates the centrality of translation in Heidegger’s work in the following words: 
Where are the thinking of language and the thinking of the history of being 
tied to each other in the Heideggerian “text”? Where is the knot that joins 
the forms of language and the historic modes of the λόγοϛ? Our hypothesis 
is that this knot is a thinking of “translation.” “Translation” refers at one 
and the same time to the question of language and Dichtung and to the 
question of the history of being. “Translation” becomes the name of the 
history of philosophy. (Escoubas, 1993, p. 341) 
       
       Despite this centrality, Heidegger’s views on translation neither form a systematic theory 
promoting a certain thesis on how to do translation nor can they be found in a formal work that 
treats the question of translation exclusively and comprehensively. The main reason scholars are 
interested in Heidegger’s reflections on translation is the question of translating Heidegger’s works 
in general, and his key words in particular. Heidegger’s German proves so challenging to translate 
that translators have desperately been seeking guiding clues in Heidegger’s own views on 
translation. It turns out that these views contain philosophical insights more interesting than to be 
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simply called upon as mere means to help translate Heidegger’s language. Their conclusion is that 
translation for Heidegger becomes “a philosophical problem fundamentally implicated in the 
thinking of Being” (Zisselsberger, 2008, p. 313). 
       One evident thesis in Heidegger’s thoughts on translation is his call for a radically different 
approach to translating works of thinking and poetizing, an approach that is quite distinct from the 
traditional ways of thinking and doing translation. In Der Satz vom Grund, he states “Translating 
and translating are not equivalents if in one instance what one is concerned with is a business letter 
and in another instance a poem. The former is translatable, the other is not.” (Heidegger, 1957, p. 
145). Heidegger here references the idea of the untranslatability of the works of thinking and 
poetry. In this paper, I will argue that the untranslatable in a work of thinking and poetry is key to 
Heidegger’s thought on translation in the sense that it makes manifest what Heidegger at times 
calls the claim of language, in this case, the claim language makes on the translator. This claim 
(Anspruch, Zuspruch, or Zusage) (Heidegger, 1982; 2013) is a calling for a different approach to 
thinking the nature of language, and it arises, according to Heidegger, from the fact that human 
beings find themselves always already in a linguistically pre-structured world (Heidegger, 2013, 
p. 187), a world that is opened up or disclosed, among other things, by language as “the house of 
being” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 236; 1982, p. 5) (it is in section 2 that the notion of the claim of 
language will be tackled in more detail). Charles Taylor places Heidegger’s approach to thinking 
language within what he refers to as the “expressive-constitutive” understanding of language and 
art that took place in the late eighteenth century in Germany (Taylor, 2005, p. 433). This view 
arises in reaction to the mainstream doctrine which conceives of language as an instrument of 
expression in the sense of externalizing what already is there (thoughts, purposes, impressions). 
In contrast, the “constitutive” view approaches language as constitutive (making and shaping) of 
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these thoughts and purposes. The originality of Heidegger’s thinking within the “constitutive” 
tradition lies in his claim that “language speaks” (Heidegger, 1982, 2013), and that our speaking 
stands only as a response to the speaking of language.        
       I will argue that, for Heidegger, in hearing and responding to the claim of language manifest 
in the untranslatable, the translator is no longer in the sphere of conventional translation – whose  
final objective is to offer a product/text with the closest meaning to the original, heedless to the 
claim of language – but in the realm of a different kind of translation he refers to as “essential 
translation [wesentliche Übersetzung]” (Heidegger, 1991, p. 97), and which he himself carries out 
in his translations of the Pre-Socratics and in the essay “Anaximander’s Saying” in particular. I 
will do this by showing, in the first section, that the untranslatable in Heidegger’s reflections on 
translation goes beyond the ordinary definition, as the total lack of an equivalent, deep into its 
nature as the region where foreign languages essentially meet in a dialogue in which translation as 
a transposition of meaning between languages becomes possible. What I mean by this is that 
Heidegger is not so much concerned with the problem of translating untranslatable words in 
literary works but more with approaching a thinking of the “essence” of translation and of 
language, through the untranslatable, as that which makes the region of the essential difference 
between languages, and by consequent, is that which makes a necessary call for translation. In the 
second section, by providing an exegesis of Heidegger’s views on language, I will argue that the 
untranslatable does not come in a secondary position to language’s primary purpose as 
communication, but it is a fundamental element inherent to the “essencing” (Wesen) of language 
as showing things and disclosive of the world. In Heidegger’s thought, translation and the 
untranslatable move from the realm of conventional interlingual translation deep into the dynamics 
of the “essencing” of language as thought and world shaping. In the final section, the aim is to 
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show that in light of Heidegger’s unconventional thoughts on language, a new approach to 
translating works of thought (essential translation) proves necessary, since what matters in works 
and words of thought is not the message the author wants to impart but the way language unfolds 
itself into these words, an unfolding of language that takes place as an originary, innerlingual 
translation triggered by the fundamental untranslatable inherent to the “Wesen” of language.       
 
Section 1: The Untranslatable in Heidegger’s Thought on Translation    
It is noteworthy that Heidegger’s reflections on translation do not address the question of 
translation in general, that is, thinking the nature of translation in the ordinary, conventional sense 
where texts are transferred from one language to another. His focus is rather on the problematic of 
translating literary texts or works of thought. For him, translating a text whose aim is to convey a 
formal and objective message is fundamentally different from translating a poem or a philosophical 
saying. It is my conviction that Heidegger’s statement about the untranslatability of a poem in 
contrast to the translatability of a business letter perfectly sums up his views on translation since 
it contains key elements he refers to in different places in his discussion of translation. First, it is 
clear that Heidegger distinguishes between two distinct kinds of translation, one that concerns texts 
with objective, informational content, and one that deals with literary and philosophical texts. 
Second, such distinction between different kinds of translation where each concerns a different 
kind of text leads us to the unavoidable conclusion that what is at stake here is the presence of two 
different uses of language. Third, the most striking difference between the two kinds of texts and, 
thus, the two different uses of language is the inherent untranslatability of the works of thought 
and poetry2. In an interview published in Der Spiegel, Heidegger highlights that neither poems nor 
works of thought are translatable3 in contrast to business letters4 and science reports. 
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        Heidegger’s claim that there are at least two different kinds of translation can be taken as an 
instance of a heedful response to the claim of language manifest in the language of poems and 
thinking. Indeed, language has always already been calling our attention to give a second thought 
to the true “Wesen” of language. A call, once heard, makes the hearer grasp a different “essence” 
of language distinct from the conventional one that used to take language to be no more than an 
instrument to articulate information. In this respect, the untranslatability of the work of thought 
offers itself as a moment of the claim language makes on us; and only in a mindful encounter with 
the untranslatable that we in general and translators of such works in particular are able to hear the 
claim that the language of a work of thought is calling for a different kind of translation that 
Heidegger, in Der Satz vom Grund, refers to as “essential translation [wesentliche Übersetzung]” 
(Heidegger, 1991, p. 97). 
        Still, Heidegger raises the problematic of translating the work of thought to a paradox when 
he places it between its essential need for translation and its inherent untranslatability 
(Zisselsberger, 2008, p. 315). In Hölderlin’s Hymn: “The Ister”, Heidegger points out that 
“works” that call for interpretation, such as those of Hegel and Kant, are “in accordance with their 
essence in need of translation”5 (Heidegger, 1996, p. 62). Even though he puts it in less radical 
words, Benjamin addresses, I believe, the same problematic when he states in “The Task of the 
Translator”: 
Translatability is an essential quality of certain works, which is not to say 
that it is essential for the works themselves that they be translated; it 
means, rather, that a specific significance inherent in the original manifests 
itself in its translatability. (Benjamin, 2002, p. 254) 
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 If the kind of translatability Benjamin depicts in this passage is taken in the sense of the mere 
possibility for a work of art to be translated to another language, his claim would amount to trivial 
truism that does not add much to the question of translating works of thought. What he means by 
such “translatability” as “an essential quality” is something, I would argue, that goes along the 
lines of what Heidegger sees as the essential need of a work of thought for translation. When 
Heidegger mentions the works of Hegel and Kant vis-à-vis their need for translation, he means 
that something new in the source text unfolds itself when it is read in other words, either in the 
same language or a different one. This translatability by virtue of which new dimensions of 
meaning unfold cannot be possible unless the translator seriously heeds the untranslatable in the 
text as the locus of the possibility of translation. The untranslatable word is that which presents 
itself as the element that contains and displays the essential need for translation.  
       The untranslatability Heidegger sees immanent in a work of thought does not mean the mere 
impossibility of transferring a text or a word in a text to another language. It is not about the lack 
of an appropriate or exact equivalent. As a matter of fact, poems and philosophical texts have 
always been and will always be translated (Zisselsberger, 2008, p. 316). What Heidegger means 
by the “untranslatability” of works of thought can be best put in Zisselsberger’s words:  
To say that works of thought and poetic works are “untranslatable” means 
first of all that they confront us with the limits of language and therefore 
force us to experience language differently altogether. (Zisselsberger, 
2008, p. 316)    
 
       It is noteworthy that the untranslatable is no longer viewed as the challenge that hinders the 
process of transferring a text from one language to another, but as a challenge that invites the 
translator to experience language differently. According to Vezin, the possibility of a translation 
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of works of thought lies in taking the “untranslatable” in interlingual translation seriously as an 
object of thought and a challenge to thinking itself: “preserving the obstacle of the untranslatable 
without resigning oneself to incommunicability, rather making out of this incommunicability an 
essential provocation” (Vezin, 1987/88, p. 125). If the translator is not provoked by the challenge 
of encountering the untranslatable, s/he will miss, and fail to hear, the claim and, thus, fail to 
respond by reconsidering the usual conception of the nature of language, which is the central claim 
that language makes on us. The untranslatable shows that language sometime refuses to lend itself 
to our control. A refusal that should be taken no less than a power (Emad, 1993), sway (De 
Gennaro, 2000), or some ενέργεια (Maly, 1995) essential to language. The untranslatable thus 
becomes a showing of language itself.  
       Key to the moment of language showing itself is the encounter with the limits of language. 
Limits here should not be thought of in pure negative terms, that is, as weaknesses that hinder 
language from providing relevant terminology to new, unfamiliar thoughts. In a short review to 
George Kovacs’ “Heidegger’s Experience with Language”, Trawny clarifies Heidegger’s intention 
to bring language to its limits: 
Heidegger’s experience in writing, in teaching and in conferences leads to 
an encounter with the limits of the usual, established language, with the 
barriers and closures of the culturally solidified (especially metaphysical) 
language, with the determinations of (most of all Western) languages, and 
even with the internal limits of the mother tongue. But the experience of 
these limits is not something negative, but positive, liberating, promising, 
and deeply hermeneutic. (Trawny, 2013, p. 218) 
 
       To confront the limits of language is “to liberate words from their common, everyday meaning 
familiar to us” (Zisselsberger, 2008, p. 314). A good reading, understanding and translating of a 
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work of thought rests on an understanding of its words far from the already established and 
solidified meanings. Unlike the way language is used in a news article, the “essence” of the 
language of a poem is to free itself from the fetters of an expected clear and to-the-point message, 
meaning, idea, etc. that the poet tries to externalize and convey to the audience. Of course, there 
must be something said in a poem, but it is less up to the saying of the poet than it is to the unfolding 
of language in the poem that meaning, whatever its nature, emerges. The peculiarity of the 
language of the poem invites us to listen to language itself rather than to the poet. The latter 
becomes a medium through which language speaks. To liberate language from solidified meanings 
is to let “words sound in their ambiguity” (Zisselsberger, 2008, p. 314) by way of, e.g., mobilizing 
old and forgotten etymological meanings in an attempt to let language manifest its true nature, its 
‘essencing’ (what Heidegger calls das Wesen der Sprache). In this way, even native speakers of 
the language can sense, in its peculiarity, the foreignness of their own language to them. The belief 
in a relationship of control over language they once took for granted begins to weaken with a new 
view of language taking over. This is a moment when it becomes possible to hear the claim of 
language, that “language speaks”. 
        For Heidegger, to encounter the untranslatable, I would argue, is “to undergo an experience 
with language […] to let ourselves be properly concerned by the claim of language by entering 
into and submitting to it” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 57) Heidegger goes even further to show what an 
experience (Erfahrung) is:  
To undergo an experience with something – be it a thing, a person, or a 
god – means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, 
overwhelms and transforms us. When we talk of “undergoing” an 
experience, we mean specifically that the experience is not of our own 
making; to undergo here means that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it 
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strikes us and submit to it. It is this something itself that comes about, 
comes to pass, happens. (Heidegger, 1982, p. 57) 
 
        George Kovacs qualifies such experience with language as a break-through, an opening, a 
new beginning, the disclosure and possibility of a deeper, liberating-ontological, be-ing-
disclosing-intimating language and saying6 (Kovacs, 2011, p. 95-109; Trawny, 2013, p. 218). The 
fundamental change resulting from this experience with language does not concern the mere 
relationship of human beings with language as such, i.e., as a zoon logon echon: the animal that is 
able to speak or the animal that has language. If we take into consideration Heidegger’s claim that 
“language is the house of Being” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 236; 1982, p. 5), “if it is true that man finds 
the proper abode of his existence in language – whether he is aware of it or not – then an experience 
we undergo with language will touch the innermost nexus of our existence” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 
57). In relation to the question of translation, the French philosopher and translator Antoine 
Berman identifies the existential stance of Heidegger’s definition for an experience with language 
with an encounter with “the foreign”, not as a mere object that needs to be domesticated, but rather, 
as a thing that compels the translator to put the entirety of her own existence to question (Berman, 
1992; Yun, 2013, p. 209) Part of my thesis is that “the foreign” in a language is an essential 
characteristic of the untranslatable in both interlingual and intralingual translation, and thus, the 
encounter with the untranslatable becomes itself an encounter with “the foreign”.  
       For a better understanding of the relation of the untranslatable as one manifestation of the 
claim of language, an analysis of the nature of the “untranslatable” according to Heidegger is 
necessary. It is very important to bear in mind the following two points. First, although Heidegger 
refers to works of thought and poetry as “not translatable” in the same way a business letter is, he 
never addresses the untranslatable by name; and it is his commentators (Zisselsberger, 2008; 
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Vezin, 1987; Polt, 2015; Escoubas, 1993; Maly, 1995) who bring up the untranslatable as a key 
concept in the background of his reflections of translation. Second, the untranslatable should in no 
way be grasped as the mere impossibility of finding a relevant equivalent for a word in another 
language because keeping oneself within the boundaries of this basic conception of the 
untranslatable will obstruct one’s understanding from seeing the originality of Heidegger’s 
thinking on translation (Emad, 1993, p. 324). The questions that trigger Heidegger’s interest in 
thinking translation are quite different from those which make up the backbone of traditional 
theories of translation. The most remarkable difference between the two is that while the very 
focus of traditional theories converges on the final product, i.e., the validity, correctness, relevance, 
correspondence, etc. of the text in the target language to the original, Heidegger thinks translation 
as a way7, another possible way to access “ the essencing of language [das Wesen der Sprache]”. 
In light of this distinction, the untranslatable opens up as something more mysterious and insightful 
than being thought of in the conventional way.    
       Emad reconstructs the latter two remarks in relation to Heidegger’s appraisal of the 
foreignness that rules between languages: “we grasp this [foreignness] best by looking at how 
Heidegger views the problem of semantic equivalency of translated terms. Heidegger’s opening 
up of this problem helps us to understand his thinking on translation as such.” (Emad, 1993, p. 
324). My point is to show that one of Heidegger’s rationales in juxtaposing the conventional 
approach to translation with his own views is to warn his readers that what is at stake in his views 
on translation has nothing to do with the question of semantic equivalency, and in particular of 
thinking of the untranslatable in terms of a lack of equivalents. On the other hand, the 
“foreignness” that reigns between languages Heidegger appraises, in Emad’s words, is itself the 
“foreignness” that unfolds itself as the untranslatable that Heidegger recommends being taken as 
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an essential provocation to, in Vezin’s words, think anew “das Wesen” of translation as well as 
that of language. The identity of the untranslatable with the “foreign” in a language comes to the 
fore even more straightforward in a published dialogue between Parvis Emad and Ivo De Gennaro 
on the question of translation in Heidegger. Each of the two uses different expressions, namely De 
Gennaro’s “the uniqueness of the words” and Emad’s “the fundamental otherness”, to emphasize 
an identity relation between the foreignness of a language and its untranslatability. In an attempt 
to prove the impossibility to translate the German word Möglichkeit as used by Heidegger in his 
work into English, De Gennaro argues: 
In other words, we are in a situation of strict untransferability, 
untranslatability. What appears as a loss (namely, the fact that in English 
we cannot say what is said in Möglichkeit in the same manner as it is said 
in German) is in fact a trait of refusal (Verweigerung) which belongs to die 
Sprache als die Sprache, and which is constitutive of the uniqueness of the 
words wherein the zur Sprache bringen is accomplished. (Emad & De 
Gennaro, 2009, p. 164) 
 
What could this “uniqueness of words” be other than a basic element of the foreignness that rules 
between languages? Two pages later, Emad affirms De Gennaro’s use of the “uniqueness of 
words” by using another expression which is even more approximate to the meaning of 
“foreignness”, namely, “the fundamental otherness”: 
This fundamental otherness [of the German language that came into the 
world of philosophy with the writings of Heidegger] is extremely 
important since its emergence confronts us with the demand to come to 
terms with the task of an interlingual translation of Heidegger’s key words. 
Because I take this “otherness” and uniqueness seriously I am concerning 
myself with the issue of transfer and the issue of approximation. (Emad & 
De Gennaro, 2009, p. 166) 
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       Regardless of their divergent viewpoints vis-à-vis the interpretation of Heidegger’s reflections 
on translation, and of their choice of terminology, both Emad and De Gennaro agree to identify 
the untranslatability of philosophical texts with the “foreignness” that reigns between languages. 
In addition, Kenneth Maly, in a short paper “Reticence and Resonance in the Work of Translating,” 
attests to this identity relation in his own words as “the irremovable difference between languages” 
(Maly, 1995, p:149, 150, 155), and which gives, in thinking, a unique possibility to open up the 
word’s deeper connections in its own language (Maly, 1995, p. 149). Maly views the resonance of 
the irremovable difference between languages as a call for a transformed relationship to one’s own 
language, one that allows the deeper interconnections in that language to resonate (Maly, 1995, p. 
155). To sum up, there is a consensus among Heidegger scholars regarding an identity relationship 
between the untranslatable in the language of thought and poetry and the “foreign” that sets 
languages apart, yet, keeps them in proximity.  
        In addition to this identity relationship, there is another key characteristic to Heidegger’s 
“untranslatable”, whose discussion is frequent in the secondary literature. The idea that however 
relevant or valid a translation of a work of thought could be, there is always a remainder that 
refuses to yield itself to a coextensive correspondence between the source and the product in the 
target language. I believe there is some truth to this claim if we take into account what comes in 
Heidegger’s lecture on Hölderlin: “There is no translation at all in which the words of one language 
could or should fully cover the words of another language8” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 62).     
        Zisselsberger refers to this remainder as “the untranslatable ‘rest’ that always remains in the 
works of Dichten and Denken, [and which is] the showing of language itself”, and a page before 
he states that “the claim of language arises from what remains “untranslatable” and foreign in 
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language itself9” (Zisselsberger, 2008, p. 315-316). The showing of language, manifest in the 
encounter with the untranslatable, is the showing of the “Wesen” of language as qualitatively 
distinct from being a mere tool of communication. This intricate relation between the 
untranslatable and the claim of language will be analysed in more details in the next section. 
        For Maly, this remainder or rest is a “space between ‘accuracy’ and the possibility of a 
‘different’ translation”, and in this space that the question “what is being said?” resonates (Maly, 
1995, p. 148). Maly’s claim comes as a concluding comment to William Richardson’s clarification 
that his incorporation of Heidegger’s German into his English text is not to support the claim of 
accuracy of his translation of Heidegger but to draw attention to the fact that the German original 
might be translated differently. What is of interest in Maly’s claim is that once we distance 
ourselves from the claim of “accuracy” – especially in translating works of thought – a persistent 
need to hear what is being said keeps resonating in a space of possibilities. If we do not think the 
“untranslatable” in terms of always seeking to hear what is being said in a work of thought, then 
we are thinking it in terms of an obstacle to the accuracy of translating. In addition, the “space” 
Maly posits in his comment proves necessary to the whole thesis of his paper “Reticence and 
Resonance in the Work of Translating” for the simple reason that one cannot think of reticence or 
resonance without presuming a space as their condition of possibility. Second, the paper 
emphasizes the role of en-ergeia as a “many-faceted dynamic” that allows the deeper 
interconnections in a language to resonate. Once again, an en-ergeia as a working movement in 
language is only possible when there is a space. The concept of “accurate” translation in fact 
implies a coextensive correspondence between words in different languages, a fact that closes the 
space for the possibility of another different translation, and thus understanding and translating 
words become “automatic” where dictionaries have the upper hand. 
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       Richard Polt talks about this “remainder” in different terms. He uses words such as 
“uncertainty, loss, residue, room, gliding” to approach the problem of translating Heidegger’s key 
word “Ereignis”. First, Polt claim that “in a series of private texts, starting with the 1936-1938 
Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger returns to this word [Ereignis] that he had 
neglected since 1919 and gives it a new, greater significance” (Polt, 2015, p. 412). Giving new, 
greater significance to usual words (in this case, Ereignis) could not be possible if we assume that 
these words are “hermetically sealed”, that is to say, in coextensive correspondence with their 
actual meanings where no new “showing” or “saying” of the word is possible to emerge. Giving 
usual words new meanings implies that “there may be room for a certain ‘gliding’ between fields 
of ownness” (Polt, 2015, p. 415). By “ownness”, Heidegger means a certain intimate belonging 
(ownness) manifest in “the broader problem of whether it is possible to find connections to 
meaning that is not one’s own” (Polt, 2015, p. 415). Second, Polt claims that even if we come up 
with “a third language, over and above the source and target languages – a neutral, crystal-clear 
language that would serve as a touchstone for the accuracy of the translation” – the acts of 
translation between this perfect language and natural languages “are themselves subject to 
uncertainty and loss” (Polt, 2015, p. 416). It remains the same “uncertainty and loss” that reigns 
between natural languages. Finally, being so occupied with the problem of how to qualify the 
untranslatability of Heidegger’s key words, Polt calls upon the word “residue” to name the content 
that remains untranslatable between German and Asian languages and traditions. Having such 
diversified terminology in the secondary literature to approach the problem of the untranslatability 
of works and words of thought is supporting evidence to the thesis that the untranslatable is a space 
of possibilities, and not a barrier that hinders understanding and transfer. All the terminology that 
is used to qualify the “remainder” as a key characteristic of the untranslatable are words that 
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provoke and invite new ways to think language in general and translation in particular differently. 
It is depicted as both a “space” or “room” for new meanings to emerge and as a “residue, rest, 
uncertainty” that provokes thinking.  
        In addition to the two aforementioned key characteristics of Heidegger’s “untranslatable”, 
there is another characteristic as important as the other two. Heidegger’s “untranslatable” does not 
lie in ordinary words of the ordinary use of language. It rather lies in a different kind of words, the 
kind of words that elevates literary works to the status of a work of thought. When reading the Pre-
Socratics, Heidegger focuses on words, such as, Logos, Aletheia, Moira, etc.10 so to hear again 
their true sayings as they were heard by those philosophers themselves and not as they have been 
understood, translated and transferred to us by their successors. Not only that, Heidegger makes 
his own thinking stand on other key words, such as, Being, Dasein, and Ereignis, to name but a 
few. If there is anything that makes Heidegger’s texts untranslatable, it must be these key words 
which faces scholars and translators with serious challenges, such as, how to translate German 
familiar words with unfamiliar meanings of Heidegger’s thought to other European languages. In 
his article “The Untranslatable word? Reflections on Ereignis”, Richard Polt suggests that  
Now the word Ereignis must be thought from the matter itself that has been 
indicated and must speak as a guiding word in the service of thinking. As 
a guiding word that is thought in this way, it can no more be translated 
than can the Greek word logos and the Chinese dao. Here the word 
Ereignis no longer means what [the Germans] otherwise call any 
happening, an occurrence. (Polt, 2015, p. 407, my emphasis)  
 
According to Polt, it is Heidegger who first claims that “Ereignis can be translated sowenig wie, 
literally ‘just as little as,’ logos and dao” (Polt, 2015, p. 408), that is, as “guiding words”. The idea 
of the untranslatability of words of thought has been referred to by other Heideggerian scholars 
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though in different terms like, basic words (Escoubas, 1993, p. 342), keywords (Emad, 2010, p. 
297, 311), essential words (Emad, 1993, p. 333), thoughtful words (Zisselsberger, 2008, p. 315), 
Denkweg-word (Emad & De Gennaro, 2009, p. 172).   
       This category of key words Heidegger is concerned about does not comprise only words such 
as logos, aletheia, ethos, dasein, Ereignis, being, etc. but every word through which we can still 
hear the speaking of language, i.e., words that invite us to think their “essence” away from their 
being designated as reference to some beings. As a matter of fact, these key words as used by 
Ancient Greek (logos, aletheia…) or German (Sein, Ereignis…) do have ordinary meanings 
articulated in everyday life communication, but only that these words speak to thinkers (Pre-
Socratics and Heidegger in this case) differently. These thinkers are made to hear a saying of the 
word different from the sayings already consumed in ordinary usage. They become words of 
thought (thoughtful words) because their new saying cannot be accessed unless they are thought 
(thinking in Heidegger’s sense as different from the calculative, instrumental thinking) in their 
“essencing” as unfolding into language. This insight can be better understood when we take into 
account Heidegger’s statement in “The Way to Language”: “This way-making puts language (the 
essence of language) as language (Saying) into language (into the sounded word)” (Heidegger, 
1982, p. 130). Put differently, key words or words of thought as guiding words – unlike ordinary 
words – are the words where the essence of language as Saying (that is, language’s ‘speaking’ 
prior to, but through, human speech, thereby ‘claiming’ and ‘addressing’ us) can be most spoken 
by language and heard by thinkers and poets into their response as “spoken” words, that is to say, 
into a poem or a philosophical saying.  
       Nevertheless, Heidegger does not seem to discourage us altogether from trying to translate 
thinker’s key words. What Heidegger seem to tell us is that a good understanding, and thus a 
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translation, of a work of thought depends essentially on the understanding of its key words as 
“guiding words” and not as ordinary words with well-determined referents or meanings. Why these 
key words need to be given a special status than ordinary words, it is because, as Ricoeur puts it: 
great primary words…are themselves summaries of long textuality where 
whole contexts are mirrored [and of] intertextuality which is sometimes 
equivalent to revival, transformation, refutation of earlier uses by authors 
who fall within the same tradition of thought or opposing tradition. 
(Ricoeur, 2006, p. 6) 
 
       Put differently, key words of philosophy and poetry do not speak the same way ordinary words 
do. They do not respect the general linguistic rule that for each word there must be at least one 
defined referent, be it a determined object or a determined relation between objects, otherwise the 
word is meaningless. On the contrary, philosophical and poetic key words speak as suggestive 
reminders of connections in the same language. Polt goes further to claim that these key words are 
“thickening or condensation” of created or discovered passages along which meaning can be 
brought together. He adds: “it may be that meanings fully come to life only when they travel along 
such passages and experience thickening. This is a process of translation” (Polt, 2015, p. 419), and 
that is because such words, as real, historical words, will inevitably bring with them “half-silent 
connotations [that] alter the best-defined denotations” (Reicoeur, 2006, p. 6). This goes along the 
lines of Francois Vezin’s conclusion to his “Translation as Phenomenological Labor” when he 
states that “Dasein is not a word; Dasein is a thought”. It is more a concern to understand the word 
than being preoccupied with swapping it with a French word. Vezin inferred this conclusion from 
a statement Heidegger made at the end of a lecture course in 1935 when he said that “Sein und Zeit 
is not so much a book as it is a task given to us to accomplish”; and in an interview in 1966, 
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Heidegger said “as little as one can translate a poem, just as little can one translate a thought” 
(Vezin, 1987/88 p. 136). 
       According to Heidegger, what makes a work of thinking untranslatable is the kind of words 
of which it is made. Words that no longer name objects but provoke and show the way to thinking. 
There is nothing specific in a “thoughtful word” to translate, yet, “everything depends on our 
paying heed to the claim arising out of the thoughtful word” (Heidegger, 1992, p. 3). Words such 
us Logos, Alethea, Dasein, Ereignis are untranslatable not because translators fail to transfer their 
semantic content to other language, but because we should treat them as untranslatable if we are 
to give these words their full due. Dealing with words of thought the same way we ordinarily 
translate other words draws us away from seeing their peculiarity that, instead of informing us, 
they guide us to think while at the same time keeping their claim on us to reconsider our view of 
and relation to language.  
  
Section 2: The Nature of the Claim of Language 
When the untranslatable is encountered in a work of literature in a procedure of conventional 
translating, the task of the translator is unproblematic: to render the untranslatable word 
translatable, that is, to call upon any available conceptual and linguistic tool to overcome the 
problem by minimizing it into a technical, linguistic predicament. There is no mystery sensed, no 
claim heard, and no encounter with the “Wesen” of language. This kind of translation is grounded 
on a long philosophical tradition that makes language “surrender itself to our mere willing and 
trafficking as an instrument of domination over beings” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 223). But when 
Heidegger speaks of the untranslatability of works of thought and poetry, he is identifying the 
encounter with the untranslatable with an experience with language. This experience can only take 
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place when the untranslatability of a word of thought is taken as a question-provoking mystery 
revealing the mysterious character of language. For Heidegger, this mystery lies in the fact that 
“language still denies us its essence: that it is the house of the truth of Being” (Heidegger, 2008, 
p. 223). While Heidegger grasps the “Wesen”of language in its essential ungraspability, 
philosophers of language and linguists not only are unable to free language from Aristotle’s “zoon 
logon echon” – where the essence of the human being is defined in terms of having language or 
having the ability to speak – but they also objectify its being, turn it into a mere instrument. The 
fundamental difference between Heidegger and the mainstream philosophers of language is his 
struggle to preserve the “poetical” mysteriousness of language and to save it from being minimized 
to an object for calculative thinking (that is, rendering language a code of signs and rules to better 
serve the problem-solving aspect of our thinking).  
       The kind of thinking that Heidegger believes qualified to pave the way to access a true 
“Wesen” of language is not the artificial-calculative thinking which preoccupies itself with 
“explaining from highest causes” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 221) by way of determining the “technical-
theoretical exactness of concepts” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 219), i.e., the thinking where “language 
thereby falls into the service of expediting communication along routes where objectification – the 
uniform accessibility of everything to everyone – branches out and disregards all limits” 
(Heidegger, 2008, p. 221); it is rather a thinking that sees and cares for the multidimensionality of 
“things” as independent from their instrumental utility to us; it is a thinking that “remains purely 
in the element of Being and lets the simplicity of its manifold dimensions rule” (Heidegger, 2008, 
p. 219). One aspect of this multidimensionality that Heidegger sees essential to the “Wesen” of 
language is the ambiguousness inherent to natural languages. This ambiguousness should not be 
taken in a negative sense, to be viewed as a problem to explain away so that language becomes a 
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better tool enabling clearer acts of communication – rendering it a predetermined “code of 
behaviour” (Escoubas, 1993, p. 343) rather than a language as such – but  it should be taken rather 
as a provocation and invitation to re-consider the traditional definition of the essence of language 
and to start to establish a new relationship with language other than the one that reduces it to our 
tool. In a letter to W.J. Richardson, which appears as a preface to Heidegger: Through 
Phenomenology to Thought, Heidegger wrote:  
Every “formula” can be misunderstood. In accord with the manifold 
(many-faceted) dynamic of being and time, all of the words that say/show 
this dynamic – like Kehre, Vergessenheit, and Geschick – are also 
ambiguous. Only a many-faceted thinking reaches all the way into the 
corresponding of saying/showing of the matter at issue in that dynamic. 
And then: This manifold/multifaceted thinking does not require a new 
language, but rather a transformed relationship (a shift in the relationship) 
to the Wesen of the old one. (Richardson, 1967, p. xxii-xxiii) 
 
Heidegger’s call for a “transformed relationship” to language to meet the manifold/multifaceted 
thinking – in opposition to the one-dimensional subject-object relationship to language – arises 
from his view that language is “the proper abode of man’s existence” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 57), 
i.e., wherever the human being is, language is to be found. “Language belongs to the closest 
neighborhood of man’s being. We encounter language everywhere” (Heidegger, 2013, p. 187). In 
other words, in every side of the human being’s existence language has a role to play, in shaping, 
more or less, an aspect of her world. It is through the lens of our language that we see, interact and 
extend the world around us, and not that we call upon language to access an already given world. 
The result is that attempts to think and study language in separation11 from the being of the human 
being amounts to an uprooting-like abstraction of language from its natural environment and 
 23 
exposing it to all kinds of anatomical dissections and analyses of its parts to, ironically speaking, 
understand its dynamical powers. This scientific approach to the understanding of language 
considers the findings in linguistics and philosophy of language as universal truths that are 
applicable to every language. This approach is based on a metaphysical presumption of the 
existence of a universal essence to every being including language.  
       According to this view of language, translation in a general sense preoccupies itself with the 
transfer of meaning as semantic content from one linguistic capsule (the word/term in this case) to 
another linguistic capsule in another language believing that the relationship between word and 
meaning is necessarily purely objective, where the word as term has no bearings on its meaning. 
If this kind of thinking the relation between the word and its semantic content seems unproblematic 
in translating a business letter, it becomes highly problematic when what is at hand is a work of 
thought or a poem. The reason is that in the business letter the semantic content is clear since it is 
already objectively determined (the nature of the transaction/service, name of the product, date, 
time, place, etc.) whereas  words in a work of thought or poetry get pregnant with meaningful 
dimensions other than those already agreed upon in the public realm, and which are reticent of the 
thinker’s or poet’s intimate experience with the speaking of language. In words of thought, we 
have “a picture of language as making possible new purposes, new levels of behaviour, new 
meanings, and hence as not explicable within a framework picture of human life conceived without 
language” (Taylor, 2005, p. 434).  
       In a work of thought or poetry, language manifests a different “Wesen” to the one linguists 
elicit from our everyday use of language.  In “Language”, Heidegger clearly states that “language 
speaks” (Heidegger, 2013, p. 188).  The key move in this statement is that “he inverts the usual 
relation in which language is seen as our tool, and speaks of language speaking, rather than human 
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beings” (Taylor, 2005, p. 433). This inversion is not coincidental or rhetorical; it becomes fully 
intentional and highly meaningful when we pay attention to the italics of the very first two 
sentences with which Heidegger opens “Language”: “Man speaks. We speak when we are awake 
and we speak in our dreams.” For Heidegger, it is no longer humans who speak but language. But 
what then? What does it mean that language speaks rather than us? And what “Wesen” does the 
speaking of language show? 
        To understand what Heidegger means by “language speaks”, it is necessary to understand 
what he is after or what he seeks by the “Wesen” of language. One thing for sure is that he is far 
from taking it as “essence” because it is this metaphysical concept that has been channeling 
Western thought to suppose that there is some essential/fundamental/basic being that is universal 
to all languages: “a theoretical grasp or formal definition of language as an entity” (Backman, 
2011, p. 64), and on the grounds of a graspable essence as an entity that language has been 
understood and viewed as a tool or rather a vehicle to carry and convey messages. Still, Heidegger 
remains doubtful about the implications that an inadequate understanding of the word “Wesen” 
might lead to. It is not coincidental that among his many papers on language, he never titles a paper 
“What is Language?”, and that is because he is aware that the answer to this metaphysical question 
will normally be “language is…”, an answer that will automatically identify language as a being 
with a determined essence graspable in what comes after the “is”. In “The Nature of Language”, 
the English translation of “Das Wesen der Sprache,” Heidegger puts the title into question arguing 
that this latter “sounds rather presumptuous, as though we were about to promulgate reliable 
information concerning the nature of language” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 70). In rewriting the title into 
a question “the Nature” – of Language?,” Heidegger questions the meaning of “nature” – or 
“essence” – itself and warns the reader not to rely on any presupposed understandings of the word 
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such as those we get from titles such as “The Nature of Art,” “The Nature of Freedom”, etc. In 
“Language”, Heidegger explains right on the second page why he opts for the single word 
“language” as a title without any kind of elaboration, claiming that  he “does not wish to assault 
language in order to force it into the grip of ideas already fixed beforehand” or “to reduce the 
nature of language to a concept” (Heidegger, 2013, p. 188). Other titles such as “Words,” “The 
Way to Language,” “A Dialogue on Language,” are further examples on how Heidegger is so 
cautious not to channel his readers to believe in the existence of a fixed and graspable essence or 
nature of language.  
        Then, how shall we understand this “Wesen der Sprache”? In the first endnote to “Thinking 
More Deeply into the Question of Translation”, Emad shows how the German word “Wesen” faces 
translators with great difficulties and that is because English language does not have a word that 
“reflects the movement of emerging in its ongoing character which is crucial for this word 
[Wesen]” (Emad, 1993, p. 338). After criticizing several approaches to the translation of “Wesen” 
accusing them of stifling the verbal dynamic of the German word, Emad approves of and adopts 
Kenneth Maly’s expression “root unfolding” for it preserves the movement of emerging in its 
ongoing character. In light of this understanding of “Wesen”, language in Heidegger’s statement 
“language speaks” should first and foremost be thought of in its speaking as “doing” rather than 
in its being as in the beingness of beings.  
       The question that legitimately arises now is “what is the nature of the speaking of language?” 
Heidegger points out that this question is “the crux of our reflection on the nature of language” 
because “it remains quite obscure just how we are to think of essential being, wholly obscure how 
it speaks, and supremely obscure, therefore, what to speak means” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 95) The 
obscurity of the claim “language speaks” arises from the fact that “language proves incontestably 
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to be expression” while “in its essential nature, the speaking of language is not an expressing” 
(Heidegger, 2013, p. 195). “Language speaks” proves obscure for the calculative mindsets as they 
could not grasp language apart from its usefulness in the day-to-day communications as imparting 
information by way of written or verbal expression.  
        If this speaking of language is not expressing, then in what way does language speak? And 
where could this speaking be heard if not in the realm where language is mostly used? To the first 
question, Heidegger answers: “the essential being of language is Saying as Showing” (Das 
Wesende der Sprache ist die Sage als die Zeige), and in an elaboration to this statement, he adds: 
“the moving force in Showing of Saying is Owning” (Das Regende im Zeigen der Sage ist das 
Eignen) (Heidegger, 1982, p. 123, 127 respectively). The kind of showing characterizing language 
is not that which shows things already present in the world through signs, but it is a Showing that 
makes things present in the world in the first place, a Showing that discloses world by “bringing 
all present and absent beings each into their own, from where they show themselves in what they 
are and where they abide according to their kind” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 127). Heidegger calls this 
moment Owning or Appropriation (Ereignis12) because “it yields the opening of the clearing in 
which present beings can persist and from which absent beings can depart while keeping their 
persistence in the withdrawal” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 127). In other words, the true nature of 
language lies in its power by virtue of which it grants/gives (gibt) beingness (i.e., stable meaning 
and identity) and persistence to beings (Backman, 2011, p. 63).       
       To understand how the speaking of language grants being and persistence to things, we need 
to answer the second question. To hear the speaking of language, we have to seek it in what is 
spoken purely rather than to pick just any spoken words at random, and it is in the poem that 
language speaks purely (Heidegger, 2013, p. 192). Why poems? Because it is there where language 
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is freed and liberated from the shackles of calculative thinking that calcifies and conceals its 
disclosive power by objectifying it through the rigor and rigidity of syntactical and semantical 
rules. In a poem, words are free to speak themselves and offer a chance for a committed reader to 
experience that to the nature of language, there is far more than being a mere means of 
communication.  
        Among the poems Heidegger calls on in his search for “Das Wesen der Sprache” there is 
Stefan George’s poem “The Word”, which offers to us not only a vivid example of the poet’s 
poetical experience with language but also a rare opportunity to hear language speak most clearly 
as it does in the last verse of the poem: “Where word breaks off no thing may be.” (Heidegger, 
1982, p. 60) The poem is so telling that Heidegger devotes two exclusive essays, namely, “The 
Nature of Language” and “Words”,  to analyze each moment of George’s encounter with language 
until the moment where language itself speaks through the poet’s mouth declaring that, in 
Heidegger’s ventured paraphrasing, “No thing is where the word is lacking” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 
61). The poem recounts the experience of the poet who, believing to have brought a rich yet frail 
prize from a land of dream and wonder to his homeland, discovers that the treasure is no longer in 
his grasp and that is because he no longer has the word that the Norn (the goddess of destiny) gave 
him to name it. Taking a hint from the poem’s title “The Word”, the treasure that essentially eludes 
naming is the word itself in its very nature as language (Backman, 2011, p. 63). The poet’s 
experience with language shows that the nature of the word experienced here is not itself a thing 
as a name, i.e., a reference that semantically relates to referent. Rather, it is, as Backman puts it,  
the functioning of logos, the very articulation of a thing into a determinate 
meaningful thing […] Language as logos is the dynamic context for 
discursively constituted beings, the background event that can never itself 
become a being, resisting all objectification. (Backman, 2011, p. 64) 
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Backman’s statement is in a similar vein with what De Gennaro grasps from Heidegger’s writing 
on the disclosive nature of language: 
Language, here, is thought in its essence or sway (Wesen) as the showing 
of world. World, the incessant unfolding and opening of the dimension 
within which all beings appear, is itself not one of these beings, it retains 
itself in a difference to that which takes place within it […] as beings. (De 
Gennaro, 2000, p. 4) 
 
De Gennaro sees the disclosive character of language in its power to modulate the emerging of 
world, the initial extension, thanks to its saying, showing, and thus claiming by calling for 
response, for a naming to grant being and persistence to beings in their presence as in their absence 
(De Gennaro, 2000, p. 5). But most importantly, in every response to the claim of language, that 
is, in every spoken word showing a thing in the world, something else is necessarily shown as 
well, which is language itself. In every word that we speak, language reminds us that it is always 
already there, even before we come to the spoken word.    
       Language, through the word as name, bestows being and persistence on beings and make them 
things as Heidegger compactly states: “The word makes the thing into a thing – it ‘be-things,’ the 
thing.” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 151) To understand this event of ‘be-thinging’, we have to understand 
what Heidegger means by ‘name’. Far from being a mere designation, Heidegger suggests that 
‘name’ in Goerge’ poem “The Word” could be taken in a sense we are already familiar with in 
such expressions as “in the name of God” or “in the name of the king”, that is to say, “at the call 
of…” or “by the command of…” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 61). The poetical nature of naming is 
essentially a calling, a claim, the claim of language. A calling for what? It is a calling into the 
word. All the things that are named in G. Trakl’s poem “A Winter Evening”, such as the window, 
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the falling snow, the vesper bell, bread and wine, are called and bidden to come into “a presence 
sheltered in absence” (Heidegger, 2013, p. 197). The words of the poem do not bring things to the 
actual physical presence but they make things present in their absence “so that they may bear upon 
men as things” (Heidegger, 2013, p. 197). Heidegger presents this “bearing-upon” as follows:  
The snowfall brings men under the sky that is darkening into night. The 
tolling of the evening bell brings them, as mortals, before the divine. House 
and table join mortals to the earth. The things that were named, thus called, 
gather to themselves sky and earth, mortals and divinities. The fourfold 
are united primarily in being toward one another, a fourfold. The things let 
the fourfold of the four stay with them. This gathering, assembling, letting-
stay is the thinging of things. The unitary fourfold of sky and earth, mortals 
and divinities, which is stayed in the thinging of things, we call – the world. 
(Heidegger, 2013, p. 197, my emphasis) 
 
       If language in poetry proper enfolds its nature in such a manner as be-thinging things and 
bidding them to come and gather into a world, then what remains of the language of everyday 
speech? Why does everyday speech fail us to have an experience with language? To this Heidegger 
offers one more insight that places poetry outside the vast domain of ordinary language use. It is 
unlike any other kind of ordinary use of language, not even a privileged higher mode of it. The 
words we speak and write in everyday use are words of a “forgotten, and therefore used-up poem” 
where no call into the world resounds anymore (Heidegger, 2013, p. 205). 
       Given Heidegger’s view on language as world disclosive rather than a tool of communication, 
translation, as an activity that revolves in the closest neighborhood of language, could no longer 
be seen through the lens of its conventional identifying concepts. There is no denying that any 
change in our relation to language implies a change in the way we think and do translation. In fact, 
Heidegger’s views on language hint more or less to some implications on the question of 
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translation. To begin with, it is in a poem proper where language speaks, making its claim on us 
to hear the saying and experience its “Wesen” differently, but what is that very moment when 
language speaks as language? Surprisingly enough, it is not when language grants us with the word 
on a silver platter, it is rather the moment 
when we cannot find the right word for something that concerns us, carries 
us away, oppresses or encourages us. Then we leave unspoken what we 
have in mind and, without rightly giving it thought, undergo moments in 
which language itself has distantly and fleetingly touched us with its 
essential being. (Heidegger, 1982, p. 59) 
 
       Goerge’s poem “The Word” poeticises the moment where the poet could not find the right 
word for the treasure that concerns him and carries him away. He is quite aware that there is 
something in his grip, yet it vanishes because he lacks the word for it. In relation to the question 
of translation, one defining trait of the untranslatable is the moment when the translator fails to 
find the right word to which he can transfer what he has understood by a word in the source 
language. Therefore, and in support to my present thesis, the untranslatable offers another 
opportunity to hear the claim of language. The poet’s failure to find the word for what he believes 
most important could be interpreted as a failure to translate the knowledge and experiences he 
believes he gained into words, and thus, it could be qualified as a moment of untranslatability not 
much different from the one experienced by the translator since both (the poet and the translator) 
are certain of having something in their grip while unable to find the right word for it. But this 
does not mean that the poet’s experience with the untranslatable is the same as the translators. One 
determining distinction between the two is that the translator has an end to accomplish, i.e., to 
produce a text in the target language. Here, no matter what the untranslatable could speak, claim 
or say to the translator, and whatever the translator hears in the claim of language, the task of 
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producing the best possible translation restricts the translator’s response to the speaking of 
language into treating the untranslatable at one point as a challenge to overcome towards 
accomplishing the task. The poet’s experience with the untranslatable, on the other hand, drives 
him into an encounter with the “Wesen” of language where eventually they become one “essence”, 
or rather in less strong words, the poet becomes a mouthpiece of language. Every poem (in 
Heidegger’s sense) is the poet’s expression of his personal experience of his failure to find the 
right word, i.e., an experience with the untranslatable as manifesting a moment when language 
denies us its essence.  
        That being said, the essence of the untranslatable, as the poet’s inability to happen upon the 
right word and as a manifestation of the claim of language, can be understood with a different 
reading of the last-quoted passage from Heidegger’s “The Nature of Language” (Heidegger, 1982, 
p. 59). Heidegger maintains that language speaks to us when we cannot find the word for what 
concerns us and oppresses us. A question arises from this quote as follows: what is this 
“something” that concerns us and for which we cannot find the right word? Or, what is this 
“something” that concerns us the most as human beings? The answer is that what concerns us, 
carries us away, oppresses or encourages us the most is language itself. Through this reading it 
becomes somewhat clear how language speaks its claim through the untranslatable. It claims us 
when it activates one or more of the manifestations of one of the human being’s modes of being-
in-the-world, Care. This twist in reading Heidegger’s quote is supported by Stefan George’s “The 
Word”. The title of the poem clearly hints that the vanished prize that makes the poet renounce – 
an expression of being concerned, carried away, oppressed and encouraged, is the word itself. It is 
the word that vanishes when the poet fails to find the right word to name the word (prize or 
treasure) in order to grant it being and bring it down among other beings. In refusing to grant its 
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“Wesen” to the poet, language does speak by showing that its “essence” is fundamentally different 
from that of other beings. Its “wesen” as “essencing” is what grants and allows the rest of beings 
to have their essences.  
       Every poem (where language speaks purely, according to Heidegger) is language’s incessant 
movement of its own emerging. Every poem is the poet’s response to the claim of language 
manifested in its denying him the right word. Thus, the poem becomes the very unfolding of the 
untranslatable in the sense that the poem is the poet’s struggle to access and contain the 
untranslatable in the right word, an event which never happens because of the very nature of the 
“Wesen” of language as the incessant movement of its own emerging. This agrees precisely with 
Novalis’ proposition: “the peculiar property of language, namely that language is concerned 
exclusively with itself – precisely that is known to one” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 111), with which 
Heidegger opens “The Way to Language” to point out that “language speaks solely with itself.” 
But, what about the emerging and showing of beings as things in the world if language is solely 
concerned with itself? The answer is that the emerging of beings in the world comes as a by-
product of language’s ongoing movement of its own emerging. If the “essencing” of language is 
understood primarily as a showing of beings, then, we will be misreading Heidegger as if he claims 
that the being of language depends on the being of beings including human beings, i.e., language 
exists as the human being’s ability to access other beings. It is in the process of the essential 
unfolding of language that beings appear and disappear in the world. This is what gives things 
their transient being. Since language is not essentially concerned about the emergence of beings, 
the essence of each being is disclosed in different ways according to the way language unfolds 
itself, thus, generating the ineradicable difference between languages as a ruling foreignness in the 
form of the untranslatable conventionally understood.  
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         There is no denying that the more we delve into Heidegger’s analysis of the poet’s failure to 
find the right word for that which concerns him the most as one manifestation of the claim of 
language, the more we dissociate it from the untranslatable of conventional translation. It is true 
that the untranslatable (in the poet’s inability to find the right word to name what concerns him) 
seems to have little to do with Heidegger’s thought on the question of translation and the place of 
the untranslatable in it. This dissociation vanishes once we consider Heidegger’s conception of 
translation.    
 
Section 3: From the Claim of Language to Essential Translation 
Heidegger does not claim to have an identifiable theory of the question of translation, nor does he 
claim that his thoughts concern translation in general. He makes it clear that what concerns him is 
the translation of texts of what he exclusively considers works of thought and poetry. He also 
makes it clear that his target in thinking translation of such works is the untranslatable rather than 
the translatable when he points out that poems, unlike business letters, are not translatable; but 
poems and works of thought can be translated and are in fact being translated, and business letters 
do sometimes face us with untranslatable content. What Heidegger means by the “untranslatable” 
or the untranslatability of works of art and thought was the theme of section one and two of this 
paper, but it is still ambiguous what kind of translation he has in mind when he speaks about 
translating this kind of written work. In his discussion of translation in various places in his work, 
Heidegger refers to translation with different adjectives (productive translation, essential 
translation, originary/innerlingual translation) (Emad, 2010, p. 295; Heidegger, 1992, p. 12; 1991, 
p. 97, respectively) that, on the one hand, it becomes clear that the kind of translation he addresses 
is not the ordinary one where dictionaries have a central role, while it becomes, on the other hand, 
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hard to elicit in what way we are supposed to approach translating works of thought and poetry. A 
provisional answer to this query is that Heidegger’s aim in thinking translation is not the 
production of a final text as genuine as possible to the original, but rather to make translation a 
moment of keeping the original thinking in the work of art going on, to awake its dormant thoughts 
and develop its potentials into concrete possibilities.   
        A way to understand Heidegger’s approach to translation is to look at the word translation in 
German “Übersetzen” and understand the way Heidegger thinks its multiplicity of meaning in 
German. The word “Übersetzen” means both translation in its usual meaning (as a transfer of a 
written text from one language to another) and transfer proper (as a transposition of something 
from one place or domain to another). To make this distinction noticeable, Heidegger emphasises 
the second part of the German word “Übersetzen” to mean the former while emphasising the first 
part “Übersetzen” to mean the latter. When Heidegger thinks translation “Übersetzen” of literary 
works, he thinks it in terms of transfer “Übersetzen”, that is to say, he thinks translation not in 
terms of a mere transfer of literary text and its key words from one language to another, but in 
terms of a transfer of the thinking in/of these works from a domain of “truth” to another domain 
of “truth”, from a historical epoch to another historical epoch. For instance, when we translate 
Ancient Greek to Modern German by substituting the Greek words and phrases with their 
equivalents from German with the help of a dictionary, we are engaged in an act of ordinary 
translation “Übersetzen”. Translation as transfer, on the other hand, is that when we are translating, 
we are primarily concerned about the historical background (culture, traditions, arts) where the 
literary work was first written, about the relation of the thinker or poet to her language, and about 
the relation of language to its word, i.e., the way Ancient Greek unfolds into its spoken word, that 
is to say, the “Wesen” of Ancient Greek. In terms of the speaking of language, “Übersetzen” is 
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concerned with transferring the speaking of Ancient Greek words in their calling the elements of 
the fourfold (earth, sky, divinities and immortals) to gather and appear as things in the Ancient 
Greek world to the speaking of Modern German words.            
        That being said, it is still not straightforward what Heidegger exactly means by translation as 
transfer. Emad’s understands this transfer in terms of Heidegger’s conception of the Greek word 
“Aletheia”, as “unhiddenness”, “unconcealedness”. In his attempt to make sense of Heidegger’s 
first use of the word translation in a passage from a seminar given at Cérisy-la-Salle which reads: 
“insofar as language or the concept of language thinks ahead of any thinking, the tradition of 
philosophy necessarily becomes translation” (Emad, 2010, p. 295), Emad concludes that, given 
Heidegger’s involvement and understanding of Ancient Greek thought as well as his understanding 
of its key words, especially “Aletheia”, translation as a manifestation of the tradition of philosophy 
“no longer appears as the rigid domain of the accumulated and preserved philosophical doctrines” 
(Emad, 2010, p. 300), it rather becomes a transfer from one domain of “Aletheia” to another 
domain of “Aletheia”. In other words, Heidegger thinks translation of works of thought as a 
transfer of these works into a hardly known domain of “Aletheia”. “Aletheia” as unhiddenness or 
unconcealedness is thought by Heidegger to be the element that casts light on the determinations 
of beingness as thought within Platonic-Aristotelian philosophies, namely, constancy, presence, 
shape and boundary. Heidegger claims that “Aletheia” as unhiddenness, which the Platonic-
Aristotelian tradition threw into oblivion, is the predominant element of beingness without which 
the other four will remain hidden, and thus, unable to be shown as determinations of beingness. 
This throwing of “Aletheia” as unhiddenness into oblivion is the result of the nature of the guiding 
question of Greek thinking τἰ τὸ ὄν? – what is a being? which emphasises questions like 
determining what there is and what their determinations of beingness are. It is this question that 
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guides Greek thinking in their own domain of “Aletheia”. Starting from “Aletheia” as 
unhiddenness, Heidegger claims that there still a question that grounds for the guiding question τἰ 
τὸ ὄν? — what is a being? namely, how does Being sway? or, what is Being? with a verbal sense 
to -ing. Setting out with this question, we are in another domain of “Aletheia” different from that 
which is guided by τἰ τὸ ὄν? In this respect, the transfer Heidegger has in mind when he points out 
that the tradition of philosophy becomes translation is “when responses in this tradition [Platonic-
Aristotelian] given to the question, τἰ τὸ ὄν? Are transferred into the domain of Aletheia” (Emad, 
2010, p. 301). That is to say, to transfer and think Greek responses to the guiding question what is 
a being? in light of the “yet unquestioned and unthought domain of unhiddenness” (Emad, 2010, 
p. 301), which Heidegger claims it to be the domain of the grounding question: what is Being? or, 
how does Being sway?   
         A clarification is necessary at this point. There is a strict distinction between “domain of 
Aletheia” and “domain of Aletheia as unhiddenness”. By the first, we understand the process or 
event where beings show themselves from their hidden shelter into the world as things around us, 
but this event remains unquestioned and unthought of. In the domain of “Aletheia” as 
unhiddenness, we question the nature of beings in the world while aware of the question: how do 
these beings show themselves in our world in the first place? Or, what does it mean for a being to 
be? Or, what is the nature, the meaning and the truth of Being? For Heidegger, Western tradition 
since Plato responded to the question: what is a being? within its domain of “Aletheia” while 
overlooking to question and think “Aletheia” itself as unhiddenness13. It is only with him that the 
domain of “Aletheia” is being thought and questioned on the basis of the grounding question: what 
is the meaning of Being? which is understood in the form of: how does Being sway? That is to 
say, how does Being grant beingness to beings to bring them from shelter into their domain of 
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“Aletheia”. Emad’s exposition of his understanding of translation as transfer in terms of a transfer 
between different domains of “Aletheia” makes somehow confusing whether Heidegger means a 
transfer from one domain of “Aletheia” to another, i.e., from one tradition or historical epoch to 
the next (for instance, the transfer of Greek thought from Platonic-Aristotelian tradition to the 
Scholastic paradigm), or a transfer of the entire Western philosophical tradition from Plato to 
Nietzsche – guided by the question: what is a being? – to Heidegger’s domain of “Aletheia” as 
unhiddenness, that is to say, a shift from what is a being? to what does “being” mean?    
         Regardless of the soundness of Emad’s reading of Heidegger’s “translation as transfer” in 
terms of a transposition of thought from one domain of “Aletheia” to another domain of 
“Aletheia”, an important question arises concerning the practicality of thinking translation in terms 
of a transfer, namely, how can Heidegger’s “translation as transfer” be applied to the act of 
translating literary texts from different historical epochs or domains of “Aletheia”? In other words, 
does Heidegger have a methodology to articulate his “translation as transfer” into practical 
procedures in the act of interlingual translation? When Heidegger speaks of translation in the 
ordinary sense, he qualifies it in some places as essential or productive if it is to correspond to his 
understanding of translation as transfer.  
        When Heidegger raises the issue of the untranslatability of works of thought and poetry in 
The Principle of Reason, he soon qualifies the kind of translation that deals with such works as 
“essential” (wesentliche Übersetzung) (Heidegger, 1991, p. 97). A translation is “essential” if it 
succeeds to convey these works to the epochs which are ready for them. This conveyance “is not 
only a matter of what one is translating at the moment” (Heidegger, 1991, p. 97). It is not about 
saying “the same thing” into another language since, as Benjamin argues in “The Task of the 
Translator”,  
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what does a literary work “say”? What does it communicate? It “tells” very 
little to those who understand it. Its essential quality is not communication 
or the imparting of information. Yet any translation that intends to perform 
a transmitting function cannot transmit anything but communication – 
hence, something inessential. (Benjamin, 2002, p. 253) 
 
        Essential translation is not about which language is being translated into which language. It 
is much more concerned with the speaking of language in a work of art than with interpreting and 
transferring its semantic content. Being more concerned in the speaking of language, whose 
essential substance unfolds as “the unfathomable, the mysterious, the ‘poetic’” (Benjamin, 2002, 
p. 254), rather than in the speaking of the poet or the thinker whose responsive words remain 
restricted by the linguistic rules of conceptual language and calculative thinking, essential 
translation becomes itself an instance of language’s self-showing by unfolding its “Wesen”. This 
means that essential translation is not mainly concerned with the issue of how to remain faithful 
to the original. It is supposed, rather, to bring up something new, to heed the unthought in what is 
thought, to produce rather than to preserve. When asked how to approach a translation to his work, 
Heidegger relegates the importance of seeking the right word in favor of translating productively 
what is thought into another language (Emad, 2010, p. 295). 
         The idea of productive translation seems somehow misleading for it appears at first sight as 
devaluating terminological accuracy which makes the bedrock of the translation enterprise in 
general; but Heidegger’s suggestion includes terminological accuracy within essential translation, 
only that translators of works of thought should not exhaust all their thinking in seeking the right 
word while overlooking questions that language keeps projecting in every encounter with the 
untranslatable such as, why these unsurmountable differences between languages? Why does 
language make it hard for us to move freely between languages? For Heidegger, the most important 
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step after providing the best possible equivalent is to “measure up the word of the [receiver] 
language with the word of the [donor] language so that one understands the distinction right away; 
so that this distinction possibly sprouts as a seed and grows into a small plant.” (Emad, 2010, p. 
296) Two points in this statement need elaboration. First, how can we understand the difference 
between a word and its best possible equivalent if not as “the uniqueness of saying” that belongs 
to each word, that which remains under full appropriation by the word making it at times 
untranslatable, that is, unwilling to be appropriated by other words. Second, the sprouting seed 
that Heidegger wishes to emerge from essential translation is nothing but his hope that translation, 
instead of solidifying the speaking of language in the work of art by restricting its horizons to a 
single interpretation, seeks every possibility for the work to live longer, i.e., to allow language in 
the poem to resonate and be heard in every domain of “Aletheia” that is ready for it.  
         Last but not least, there is another element to essential translation beside its concern in 
interlingua translation. A translation within one and the same language is actually taking place. 
According to Heidegger, “we are also already constantly translating our own language, our native 
tongue, into its genuine word” (Heidegger, 1992, p. 12). We only fail to realize it while doing it. 
In his attempt to understand what Heidegger technically has in mind when thinking essential 
translation, Emad reaches the conclusion that the latter is “the one in which a foreign and essential 
word gets translated into another language, the one in which interlingual and innerlingual14 
translations intersect (Emad, 1993, p. 333). This intersection takes place when translation of a 
work of thinking into the words of other language unexpectedly brings us face to face with the 
translation of our own native tongue. Without innerlingual translation, i.e., without the 
understanding of the unfolding of words of thought into words of its own language, there is no 
way-making or way-showing that could be transferred into its translation in the other language. 
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         One example of the intersection of innerlingual and interlingual translations is Kant’s 
rendition of the Latin word “ratio” into German words “Vernunft” and “Grund”. Heidegger holds 
that Kant’s translation of “ratio” into two German words is an instance of essential translation 
because Kant could not arrive to this outcome if he failed to see that “ratio” is not “clearly 
circumscribed and resides without ambiguity on the other side of the ‘language barrier’” (Emad, 
1993, p. 333); an insight that leads Kant to hear the double saying of “ratio” in Latin as the result 
of his subtle act of innerlingual translation of the word. In the absence of a thoughtful innerlingual 
translation, interlingual translation of works of thought is liable to circumscribe a word of thought 
into one and single way of understanding it while silencing other possible sayings of the word for 
good. Yet, by innerlingual translation, Heidegger does not mean paraphrasing. It is not about 
substituting synonyms. It is a transporting that takes place without a change in the linguistic 
expression. What really happens is that “what is to be said has already been transported for us into 
another truth and clarity – or perhaps obscurity” (Heidegger, 1992, p. 12). In other words, 
innerlingual translation is the moment when new insights strike us as we happen to read a work of 
thought we have already read. At each heedful reading of a work of thought, new things appear, 
and others disappear. The same words of a poem compel us to hear them anew again and again as 
if for the first time. Innerlingual translation as a key element in essential translation reveals the 
untranslatable in a word of thought in the fact that even within innerlingual translation, there is no 
“wholesale transmission” between words (synonyms) in the same language, otherwise why do we 
need to translate our native tongue into its genuine word, as Heidegger claims? Because of the 
untranslatable essentially inherent in the “Wesen” of language, and in the uniqueness of the saying 
of each word, language is able to make a clearing (Lichtung) for new things to appear and thus a 
world to be disclosed.  
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Conclusion:          
It was my intention to show in this paper that what Heidegger qualifies as the inherent 
untranslatability of a work of thought or poetry, in comparison to the translatability of, say, a 
business letter, is in fact an expression of the claim of language manifested in the essential 
“foreignness” that rules between languages, in the semantic remainder or rest that persists even 
amongst the most relevant equivalents, and in words of thought without which a work of thought 
would not differ much from other texts where language is instrumentally used. Thanks to this 
untranslatable, among other things, that language claims us by calling our attention to hear its 
speaking as the primordial speaking that comes prior to our speaking which is, as Heidegger 
claims, a response to the speaking of language in which we are always already immersed. It needs 
a special encounter with language to hear the speaking, and it is in the poem that language speaks 
purely and freely; thus, providing us with a chance to experience its “Wesen” as an ongoing 
“essencing” rather than a static essence that can be grasped easily and made our own. The 
“essencing” of language is its power to call beings, in the name of the fourfold, into presence and 
into absence of the world. In light of this “essencing” of language, the concept of translation itself 
undergoes a change. It is no longer concerned with the transfer of meaning from one language to 
another. It becomes rather a transfer from one domain of Aletheia to another domain of Aletheia, 
which means that the translator of works of thought, instead of being preoccupied with the transfer 
of the meanings of words, she needs rather to transfer herself to the shores of the other language, 
that is, to understand in what ways that language unfolds into its world, its domain of Aletheia. 
What Heidegger calls “essential translation” is but the transfer of what is thought in that language 
as it was thought in that language, and that is exactly what he tries to do in his attempts to translate 




1 This statement comes in a passage from the transcript of the recording of a seminar Heidegger gave on 
September 1st, 1955 in Cérisy-la-Salle following the lecture “Was ist das? — Die Philosophie.” 
 
2 When Heidegger speaks of the untranslatability of works of thought and poetry, he does not mean or 
include each and every piece of writing that is generally qualified as artistic or thoughtful. Heidegger has 
in mind very specific characteristics of the kind of poetry and thinking he considers as such. As far as 
language and its speaking is concerned, a true work of poetry, according to Heidegger, is the one where the 
reader experiences an encounter with language, where it is no longer the author who speaks but language.      
 
3 Interview with Martin Heidegger, originally published in Der Spiegel 23 (1976): 217, reprinted in Antwort. 
Martin Heidegger im Gespräch, ed. G. Neske and E. Kettering (Pfullingen: Neske Verlag 1988), 108. In 
the interview Heidegger states that “Thinking can be translated as little as poetry. At best it can be 
paraphrased. As soon as a literal translation is attempted, everything is transformed.” Then he adds: 
“Business letters can be translated into all languages. The sciences (today science already means the natural 
sciences, with mathematical physics as the basic science) can be translated into all the world’s languages. 
Put more correctly, they are not translated, but rather the same mathematical language is spoken. We are 
touching here on an area that is broad and hard to cover.” 
 
4 The contrast Heidegger makes between a poem and a business letter concerns the untranslatability of their 
language and not the claim of language. Each and every spoken word is in itself the human being’s response 
to the claim of language. It is only that the claim of language is not heeded where language is meant to 
convey information as in business letters while in a poem it comes to the fore in its calling our attention to 
every word.   
 
5 It is necessary at this point to note that by translation, Heidegger means both that which takes place 
between different languages as well as that occurring within the one language. 
 
6 In these expressions, Kovacs densifies Heidegger’s prominent thoughts concerning the true “Wesen” of 
language as “liberating-ontological”, that is to say, freeing ontological questions from the fetters of 




of beings that can be or not be but rather the question of Being itself in the form of “what does it mean to 
be in the first place?” or “what is the truth of the nature of Being that grants being to beings?”. By “being-
disclosing-intimating language and saying” we understand that in hearing the claim of language in a genuine 
experience with it, other dimensions of the being of beings are disclosed to us, other things come forth, 
other meanings emerge, and that is possible only in adopting an “intimating” relationship to language, that 
is to say, a relationship that is attuned with “Care” rather than with the metaphysics of subject-object clash 
where language becomes a tool to control beings as our objects.     
 
7 Way or “Weg” is a word of thought that has a special place in Heidegger’s thinking. One way to understand 
it is to think it along the lines of Lao Tzu’ “dao” as attempted by Heidegger in “The Nature of Language” 
in On the Way to Language, 1982.  
 
8 This is a translation that comes in Kenneth Maly’s “Reticence and Resonance in the Work of Translating”, 
p. 149. It is a bit different from that of William McNeill and Julia Davis (1996), p. 62, where they translate 
the sentence as follows: “There is no such thing as translation if we mean that a word from one language 
could, or even should, be made to substitute as the equivalent of a word from another language.” I opted 
for Maly’s translation because it expresses the idea of the “remain” in translation better than McNeill’s and 
Jilia’s.  
   
9 Zisselsberger’s quote comes in one paragraph in his paper “The claim and use of language in translation”. 
While Zisselsberger’s paper unpacks the relation between the claim of language and translation in general, 
mine puts more emphasis on the untranslatable, not the untranslatable in general as ordinarily understood 
but as Heidegger conceives of it, especially in its unfolding into a work of thought or poetry. This is one 
reason I devotes a whole section to identifying Heidegger’s untranslatable drawing on his views on 
translation and on secondary literature on these views. Second, I ground my thesis on an attempt to seek 
Heidegger’s untranslatable as identified in section one in his insights on the “true” nature of language as 
exposed in his reading of Stefan’s poem “The Word” and of Trakl’s “A Winter Evening”.  
 
10 Heidegger devotes an entire book to the thinking of the Pre-Socratics trying to understand their use of 
such key words. In Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy, we have a detailed analysis 
of Heraclitus’ Logos and Alethea, Parmenides’ Moira, and a different reading and translation of 




11 In his “Heidegger on Language”, C. Taylor states that the ‘enframing’ theory of language which 
objectifies language as an instrument is grounded on the belief that the study of language can be sequestered 
from the study of humans because language, according to Steven Pinker, does not necessarily make us a 
peculiarly unique species of primate with extraordinary talents. Other animals have as highly developed 
abilities to communicate and survive as humans do, and in the same way we scientifically study other 
animals’ systems of communicating we should study human language.   
   
12 Heidegger’s use of the German Ereignis faces translators with serious difficulties, and it is still debatable 
which English word best captures the multidimensional meanings the word Ereignis speaks in German. 
Among the best attempts to translate Ereignis, we have “owning”, “appropriation” and “event”.  
 
13 Although Emad’s understanding of Heidegger’s conception of translation as transfer seems compactly 
convincing, there is still a significant lacuna in his analysis if we consider the importance of the question 
of language as it is raised at the beginning of the passage from the seminar at Cérisy-la-Salle. Emad fails 
to invoke Heidegger’s thought on language even though Heidegger makes it crystal clear that the whole 
issue of the tradition of philosophy becoming translation is grounded on one condition that “language or 
the concept of language thinks ahead of any thinking”. Apart from showing that “Aletheia” means 
unhiddenness, Emad does not find it important to explain in more details Heidegger’s understanding of 
“Aletheia” in relation to the question of language.  
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